

Chapter Six: General Conclusion and Recommendations

6.1. Introduction

This project has reviewed many scholarly documents such as books, journal articles, periodicals, Encyclopaedias, legal reports, former charters and declarations, past theses and dissertations, seminar papers and professional conference papers to provide a current discussion on the right of revolution against an unjust government that oppresses its people. Mixed reactions have been observed from various scholars and declarations and provisions of the documents mentioned above regarding this topic domain. I have blended these views into a consolidated argument through the means of incorporating Fichtean political philosophy in their interpretation and practical application.

The discussion began with a comprehensive review of human rights. Before providing the general concept of human rights, their historical roots, especially from the Middle Ages through the twentieth century were provided, with a particular emphasis on the Enlightenment era of the eighteenth century – this is because most philosophers who made human rights explicit and their eventual adoption by many countries worldwide originated during this era. The Enlightenment era served an important role in the political thought of human rights. Afterwards, the principles of human rights were discussed as well as the historical overview of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR). Also, I provided a discussion on the framework of human rights in the context of international law and finally placed the argument on the setting of modern human governance.

Also, as highlighted above, the mixed reactions from various scholars regarding the right of revolution were consolidated into a single argument through the means of including Fichtean political philosophy perspectives into the mainstream discussion. Therefore, this project also critically reviewed the Fichtean political philosophy to lay the groundwork in forming a solid argument for the current topic domain. Particularly, the Fichtean political philosophy was historicized by examining the political situation under which Fichte philosophised. Then, the discussion headed towards critically evaluating how Fichte philosophised about the outlook of state and society in addition to many political philosophies that he published as a scholar. The prominent one was his doctrine of scientific knowledge, which provides perspectives into how perceived humanity, as well as which natural rights that humans deserve and what the government can do about them. To determine how his political philosophy can be applied in the real world today, we also investigated the standpoints he took while defending the French Revolution. Finally, to update his philosophy, it was critiqued using the theory of postmodernism due to its association with contemporariness. The primary aim

was to determine if his political philosophy can fit the current world political problems and amenable to philosophical reflection.

Based on the findings of the evaluation of the Fichtean political philosophy and its critique, I evaluated the legal justifiability of major revolutions in history namely the English Revolution (1640), the French Revolution (1789-1799) and the Russian Revolution (1917-1923). The primary aim of these presentations was to determine any shift in political thought as it might be evidenced in various insurgencies and uprisings throughout history. Finally, I presented the main case study of this project, the Nigerian-Biafran Revolution (1967-1970). Various observations were made in regards to these four historical events, which led to the eventual comparison of the international law and the Fichtean perspective in justifying the legality of the right of revolution. Many observations emerged within the scope of the current study, which can help arrive at crucial conclusions regarding if it is legally right to revolt against an unjust government that oppresses its people. This chapter will present these conclusions, provide their theoretical and practical implications, make recommendations for future research based on the findings and limitations of the current study.

6.2. Conclusions

First and foremost, the findings of this project have revealed that it is legally right to revolt against an unjust government. This justification was based both on the perspectives of Fichte's political philosophy and the international human rights framework as encompassed in international law. People have a legal right to reject a government that oppresses them by using the rule of law to undermine their birth or natural rights like freedom of speech, liberty, equality, and so on. Fichte argued that natural human rights are inalienable, and even the government or the state lacks authority to manipulate them whatsoever. Also, the principles of international law revealed that the role of the government is to protect these rights using the rule of law. Therefore, a government that uses the same rule of law to undermine them is considered oppressive. However, it is worth noting that there is a big difference between moral law and rule of law, especially based on the Fichtean perspective. With reference to the explanations by Fichte, legal law cannot be derived from moral law because moral law does not depend on the voluntary establishment of a reciprocal sphere of influence. Therefore, the metaphysical basis of the concept of law involves proposing the idea of a mutually self-limiting community, which is essential for determining the applicability of law to consciousness¹.

¹ FICHTE, J. G., *The foundations of natural rights*, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

From the above excerpt, it is evident that “a people” shall define an oppressive government based on the rule of law rather than the moral law. This is because this is the only way they can achieve evidential collectivity to bargain for their freedom. In other words, there is a possibility that people have different conceptions of the moral law, which can lead to increased complexities towards achieving their collectivity in bargaining. Therefore, an oppressive government is the one that violates established rule of law such as constitutionality to gratify individual needs of the few while leaving the majority suffering without considering the tenets of the public good.

Fichte then argued that it is the fundamental responsibility of the people to use “every tone” to remind the government whenever it applies the rule of law unjustifiably, leading to the undermining of natural human rights. However, unlike Fichte who sounded politically radical in his philosophical declarations, the international law provides that people should exploit all peaceful means to seek just peace within their countries, and only use revolt as a last resort. Particularly, when peaceful means of resolving a conflict between the people and government fails, it indicates that the oppressive actions of that government are intentional or deliberate. If that is the case, then such a government is illegitimate since it does not serve the common good to promote individual freedoms of its people. Therefore, people can claim their natural rights through the use of force, as it was in the case of the French Revolution. However, their arguments on the legitimacy of the French Revolution shed more light into the legality of a revolution as it will be highlighted further in this sub-section.

Moreover, the Fichtean perspective would have supported the Biafran case because his political philosophy indicates that self-determination and political independence are inalienable human rights. Therefore, if the Federal Government of Nigeria was truly oppressing the Igbos and associated minority tribes, then the indigenous people of Biafra had a natural right to seek their freedom using revolution as their last resort. It is worth noting that Fichte implied that practical reason should be the guiding principle for the determination of whether to go for a revolution or not. He argued that the primary reason humanity exists is life and that that life must be dignified and respected by everyone, including the government or state. When the Igbo people expressed their concerns of discrimination to the Federal Government of Nigeria through their attempted military coup of 1966, the Nigerian army, under the control of the government, killed more than 80,000 Igbo people and other associated minority tribes residing in the Northern Region through a counter-coup. It is worth remarking that a majority of these people were civilians, including mothers and children. Thus, the government infringed the natural right of life and individual freedom, some of the aspects of natural human rights that Fichte defended

much in his philosophical distributions, such as *Foundations of Natural Rights*. In that case, based on the Fichtean perspective of practical reason, it would have been extremely challenging for the Easterners to continue co-existing with the Northerners under the same government. The government should not have discriminated the Igbo people in oil revenue sharing. Even if it was only perceptible and not actual, the government, through the rule of law, should have taken responsible steps to change this perception, instead of killing innocent civilians, including women and children.

Nevertheless, the Fichtean perspective can receive diverse interpretations in the postmodern world. During a postmodern critique of the Fichtean political philosophy, it was discovered that nihilists and absurdist proponents would have rejected his arguments on the basis that life is meaningless and purposeless. However, the fulfilment of human desire is inalienable, as long as it withstands the principles of morality set forth by the philosophers of the Enlightenment era such as Immanuel Kant and Fichte himself. The government has been provided with the mandate to accomplish these desires by protecting human rights by the rule of law. In a symbiotic society, morality can be considered the minimum threshold of promoting co-existence between people. From an absurdism point of view, although life is fundamentally purposeless and meaningless, human beings always desire for progress, such as technological advancement. It was revealed that progress is a feature of modernity, which is still relevant in postmodernism. Therefore, absurdism proponents would have partially rejected Fichtean political thought because its primary intention was to better the aspect of humanity based on the tenet that life should be dignified and respected. The nihilists would have completely rejected this argument because they believe that life is meaningless and purposeless, and nothing more beyond that. Finally, existentialists would have fully accepted the Fichtean political philosophy because Fichte's metaphysics of knowledge, ethics and philosophy of religion indicate that life is meaningful and purposeful and that is why humanity is also crucial, hence life should be dignified and respected by everyone, including the state. Therefore, to determine the relevance of the Fichtean political philosophy in contemporariness, it is imperative to determine the most populous aspect of postmodernity among nihilism, absurdism and existentialism. According to scholar Dirk Richter², the principle of existentialism lost its influence in the 1960s hence it is less applicable today. In that case, nihilism and absurdism stand out as the most influential principles of postmodernism in the contemporary world, thus implying that not all core tenets of the Fichtean political philosophy can also be useful in the

² RICHTER, D., *op. cit.*, p. 253.

contemporary world. Indeed, as it will be further elaborated below, although the Fichtean political philosophy is one of the foundations of the international law framework, Fichte's thoughts were less applicable during the Nigerian-Biafran Revolution – this war is among those that took place in the postmodernity era, which took the centre stage of modernity post-1960s. In conclusion, to meet the social demands of the present world, the radical application of the Fichtean political philosophy has been reduced by the current tenets of international law.

Nonetheless, it was also revealed that it is highly paradoxical to define the conditions through which “a people” can be shaped, and the eventual foundation of an independent and sovereign state through secession. For example, the majority of states of the international community failed to recognise Biafra diplomatically. Therefore, before revealing what the international law framework provides on this dilemma, it is important to remark that Fichte, in his theory of a commercial closed state, would have supported the formation of Biafra as a closed state. Particularly, he argued that open and free trade between nations can result in increased commercial competition thus powerful states oppressing the weaker ones. Notionally, in the context of the Biafran cause, the Republic of Biafra would have been conceived as a closed commercial state that is less oppressed by other states like Nigeria. Consequently, the ideals of human autonomy would have been realized in Biafra and the system of positive rights established by it. Biafran authorities led by Emeka Ojukwu argued that the Nigerian authorities undermined their individual freedoms because of its allyship with Britain that was in substantial control of oil reserves of the country. Thus, the Igbo people, due to their underrepresentation in government, did not receive an equal or equitable share of the revenue from oil resources. Together with their inalienable right to self-determination and political independence, the Fichtean political philosophy implies that the formation of Biafra would have served as the best solution to the concerns of the Igbo people and other associated tribes that consistently felt being discriminated by the Nigerian Federal Government.

Additionally, the underrepresentation of the occupants of the Eastern Region of Nigeria is palpable in the Gowon's decision to divide the country into twelve states without consulting their leaders like Ojukwu. This was after even they had initiated a coup in 1966 to voice their concerns “louder” to the government. Indeed, it is the action of Gowon to divide the country into twelve states, without the consultation of Igbo leaders, that resulted in Ojukwu's decision to declare Biafra an independent and sovereign state.

Also, this study revealed that based on the principles of international law and the philosophical standpoints of Fichte, the Biafran-Nigerian Revolution was highly unprincipled. During the 1966 counter-coup, the Nigerian army shot dead many Igbo civilians, thus violating

the *Jus in Bello* principle of discrimination. Also, the use of a blockade to starve the Biafran people so that the Biafran authorities can surrender can be considered devious because every person has a right to life. Many people died due to hunger and starvation. Organizations described this a genocide act being committed by the Nigerian authorities on the Biafran people, which is also a form of tribal hatred. Further, the principle of proportionality of *Jus in Bello* was disregarded because many people were killed as a consequence of the war. Literature indicates that up to three million people might have died in the course of the war (1967-1970). Therefore, more people were killed and yet the intended purpose of going into war was never fulfilled, considering that Biafra army surrendered after superior defeat by the Nigerian army. Also, it is controversial whether Ojukwu's decision to secede withstood publicity. However, based on the movements currently being initiated by the indigenous people of Biafra to reclaim their country is an indication that a majority of the people were into this idea, especially after the September massacre, whereby more than 80,000 Igbos were killed by the Nigerian army. In this case, Fichte could have argued that the Nigerian Federal Government denied the Igbo people their right to life and self-determination. Although the Biafran case of self-determination can be considered just and noble within the scope of international law, despite that many Western countries sided with Nigeria probably due to their interest in the Nigerian market for military weapons or their private interest in controlling the country's oil reserves. Overall, the Nigerian-Biafran Revolution is one of the most unprincipled insurgencies in history. The acts of the Nigerian army on the Igbo people can be considered highly undesired and criminal in nature.

Questions about the impact of foreign influence on African decision making are important because they relate to ongoing debates about what went wrong with African economic, political and social development. The shortcomings of African state institutions can be attributed to foreign intervention, the legacy of European colonialism or neo-colonialism, and the irresponsibility of Cold War powers that provided self-serving aid to authoritarian leaders³. However, this book focuses on the agency of African officials by analysing their decisions and actions, and this chapter shows that leaders in the nine francophone West African governments made very different decisions at independence. For example, despite sharing the same colonial structures – all having been part of French West Africa – newly independent Guinea, Mali and Upper Volta asked French troops to leave, while Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritania and Senegal all insisted these troops remain⁴.

³ SIMPSON, B., *op. cit.*, p. 338.

⁴ *Ibid.*

The varied strategies of these West African countries regarding alignment with Cold War powers and with France demonstrate that political power was indeed transferred to local governments upon independence, and that African leaders made decisions foreign allies did not want or predict. Still, the role of African citizens in national decision-making remained limited. Charles Tilly⁵ has suggested that this is because the means of coercion were provided by external powers. He has noted that European state institutions were formed over time as a by-product of efforts by rulers to acquire the means to wage wars, whereas in Africa, these institutions were simply imported from Europe⁶. The internal state-building process that took place in Europe also forced European rulers to negotiate with citizens on the role of state institutions because they depended on the economic contribution of their populations. In Africa, however, rulers could largely dismiss popular opinion, as both the means of coercion and the resources to sustain regimes were provided from the outside. Postcolonial states where popular support for leaders was low were prone to instability, and while African states received military equipment from external powers and were dependent on foreign technical assistance to operate and maintain that equipment, African national militaries were made up of African soldiers – who could and did influence the decisions of African governments. Research on precolonial state formation in Africa underscores the fact that state-building processes have long been determined by the ease with which the means of coercion can be monopolized. In the precolonial era, the arrival of technologically superior weapons from Europe, which could not be manufactured locally, allowed the means of coercion to be monopolized by smaller numbers of people⁷. Trade with Europeans in slaves and firearms incentivized African rulers to capture populations and extend their reach over larger territories. This made them dependent on access to European weapons, the very same technology European powers would use to establish colonial empires. The minimalist administrative structures of European colonies in Africa could not have functioned without African partners and, like postcolonial states, colonial states were formed and maintained by the cooperation of external actors with local elites.

Historical continuities can be seen both in the strategies of extraversion used by African elites – which were aimed at mobilizing the utmost resources possible from the international environment – and in their role as colonial and postcolonial gatekeepers, who had little capacity to control people and territory but effectively extracted resources and power from the flow of goods to the outside world. These continuities can be attributed to the fact that creating and

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 340.

maintaining the capacity of a state to control territory and populations is expensive, never mind the cost of legitimizing that state control and its appropriation of resources, such as by building infrastructure and providing services. Rather than appropriating resources by directly taxing the population, which was often poor and geographically dispersed, African governments attained most of their resources through foreign aid or international trade tariffs. As long as these resources were available, it was unnecessary for leaders to achieve and maintain control over the whole territory of a state, assuming they controlled the capital city. Hence, African governments had few inducements to institutionalize their rule or build effective state institutions⁸. Cold War notions about national sovereignty, and weak institutions, meant that gaining control of main administrative offices was all it took to obtain the power to sign contracts with foreign partners. As examples in this book demonstrate, only small circles of elites benefitted from the status quo in many postcolonial states, and general populations thus had little reason to support their governments⁹. This allowed a few individuals with connections and resources to easily reverse government decisions, which is why African presidents tended to keep such a close eye on the politicians responsible for national armed and security forces, as well as the military elite. The possibility of a coup constantly hung in the air, incentivizing foreign powers to develop close relations with military leadership through assistance schemes.

Other former colonies in francophone West Africa had voted to join the French Community in 1958, attaining their independence two years later, when they signed cooperation agreements with France. Mali did, however, distance itself from France soon after independence. In January 1961, for example, Mali demanded the withdrawal of French forces and the return of Malian soldiers serving in the French military¹⁰. Aware that the French position in Mali was weakening, US officials opted to provide training to parachutists in the Malian armed forces, as well as vehicles and uniforms. Despite this, Mali's socialist government was reluctant to accept additional security assistance, and within the Kennedy administration, there were differing views on whether US aid to Guinea or Mali would counteract communist influence. In the 1960s, the actions of the US and the Soviet Union in Mali notably complemented each other¹¹. For instance, the Soviets provided enormous amounts of light and heavy weapons, planes and vehicles to the country, but Mali lacked the necessary infrastructure to use them.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹¹ MCNEIL, B., *op. cit.*, p. 318.

The American ambassador in Abidjan signalled that more US assistance to Mali would anger Western-oriented African countries and send the message ‘that flirtations with the communist bloc pay off’ In 1963, the US Department of Defense stipulated that military assistance programmes should focus on internal security and should target three key US objectives: to eliminate ‘Sino-Soviet influence’, foster ‘an anticommunist western orientated military community’, and ‘contribute to stable and viable friendly governments’¹². The US thus sought to maximize contact between American trainers and Malian soldiers, but the Malians preferred ‘maximum material with a minimum working contact’ in order to reduce US influence and intelligence gathering on their military. US officials were convinced that assistance from a less threatening capitalist country could help maintain some sort of contact with Malian security forces, so they encouraged the British to provide Mali with police assistance.¹⁶⁸ This began in May 1962,¹⁶⁹ but it was short-lived and Mali eventually received police training from Czechoslovakia instead.

Additionally, it is worth noting that, with the assumption that Uche Chibuike’s claim that the outcome of the war was highly influenced by the British interest in Nigerian oil reserves¹³ was false, then the principles of international law can be considered highly vague and indeterminate. For example, international law provides that territorial integrity is also an inalienable right of “the people”. This argument was also supported by the Fichtean perspective that a closed commercial state is more effective in protecting the natural rights of its people. Despite this claim, Fichte would have still supported the Biafran case because the Nigerian Federal Government had inherently demonstrated inability to deliver a national ethos that provides for the interest of all people without discrimination based on tribe or language. Therefore, after all, the Biafran leader, Emeka Ojukwu, was right on his self-determination argument. This indicates that both the Nigerian and Biafran cases were right. However, apart from the humanitarian aid organizations, China, France, Haiti and the four African countries, namely Zambia, Tanzania, Gabon and Cote d’Ivoire, the rest of the international community was persuaded by the Nigerian argument of territorial integrity. In this case, the international community treated territorial integrity as superior to self-determination. Though according to the Fichtean political philosophy¹⁴, self-determination is superior to territorial integrity because it directly influences on individual freedom, something that Fichte believed was inalienable at the primary level. Therefore, in regards to the Nigerian-Biafran Revolution, this is the point of

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ UCHE, C., *op. cit.*, p. 111.

¹⁴ BEISER, F., *op. cit.*, p. 38.

diversion between the perspectives of Fichte and international law. Indeed, in UNMD and UDHR, the phrasing used seemingly considers territorial integrity as a superior legality element when compared to self-determination and political independence. Also, based on the role of the international community in the Biafran case, especially the British divided stand on which country to support at the beginning of the war, it can be argued that most countries tend to exploit this indeterminacy and ambiguity to serve their private interests when aiding their allies in the war. Therefore, future research should work on reducing this legal uncertainty to promote global justice and peace, considering that the world is not ready for another devastating event like those of the World Wars I and II and the Nigerian-Biafran Revolution.

The French view was contrary to that of the Americans. They feared US assistance would draw reactionary aid from communist countries and made it clear that American assistance to Upper Volta was unwelcome¹⁵. As early as 1961, the US Embassy in Ouagadougou was aware of French sensibilities on the subject and warned that it was 'undesirable' to US objectives if it at all appeared as though the US 'wished to replace French officers with Americans, even as technical advisers'. It advised that American assistance could 'be confined to vehicles, perhaps special communication equipment, construction of buildings and other items which the French are less inclined or less able to provide', and 'should require a minimum of US military personnel for training and supervision for minimum length of time.' American diplomatic reports throughout the early 1960s continued to emphasize that the US had no wish to 'supplant French [assistance], only complement' it in Upper Volta. The Americans would offer only limited aid and would not take on the responsibility of supporting the entire Voltaic military establishment, which they saw as 'something the French were more willing to do'. Despite these assurances, French officials remained suspicious of US activities. They did their best to convince the Americans that French assistance was underutilized, claiming, for example, that places allocated to Voltaic soldiers in trainings went unfilled, and arguing that there was thus no need for US training¹⁶. Voltaic complaints to US officials about the lack of training opportunities in French military schools gave the opposite impression. Nevertheless, the French objective to guard its exclusive role in the West African military sphere led the US to tailor its assistance to the Voltaic police, providing communication equipment, vehicles, and training. Much of this assistance could not be used due to insufficient budget resources.

¹⁵ TURTIO, R., *op. cit.*, p. 95.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Finally, the most prominent international law ambiguity that was discovered in this project is the scope of the meaning of “the people”. Many charters and declarations have indicated that “the people” have an inalienable right to self-determination and political independence among many others, such as freedom of speech, equality, peace, liberty, and so on. This ambiguity rose from the fact that the international community failed to recognise the Biafrans as “the people” who also deserve this right. However, seemingly, the degree of vagueness has been reducing considerably across the centuries. For instance, the use of “man” in the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* can be considered highly vague. However, this unclearness was reduced in subsequent charters and declarations like the UN Charter, ICCPR, UDHR, and UNMD when “man” was replaced with “human” and “the people”. Particularly, these recent documents mentioned above indicated that “the people” is a collection of individuals belonging to a given territory with political independence and well self-determined. However, they have also failed to indicate when “the people” can be formed legally, especially in the case of secession. For instance, which threshold should have the Biafrans met to be referred to as “the people” so that they can diplomatically be acknowledged by other states? Which criteria can be used in defining “the people?” In recent rulings, such as the International Justice Court’s decision¹⁷ on the 2010 Kosovo case liberated that “the people” can be shaped by criteria like language, tribe, ethnicity, race, religion, and so on. Based on this ruling, it can be argued that the Biafrans should have been recognized as “the people” because they were being discriminated by the Nigerian Federal Government because of their tribal affiliation to the Igbo people. Therefore, future research should also engage in standardising the universality of the definition of “the people” to ensure effective conflict resolution, such as in the case of the Nigerian-Biafran Revolution.

In general, the people have a legal right to revolt against an unjust government that uses the rule of law to undermine their inalienable human rights, such as equality, freedom of speech, and so on. However, practically, the Fichtean perspective sounds too politically deep-seated, especially in a time like in contemporariness when the world desires peace the most to foster uniform social and economic development. Therefore, responsible organizations, such as international courts like the International Criminal Court and the International Justice Court and the United Nations should innovate legal means through which even very severe conflicts like the one evident in Nigeria today can be resolved peacefully without necessarily engaging in war, considering that prior warfare events have proved to be very devastating and sorrowful to

¹⁷ INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

humanity. One of the ways is to reduce the legal indeterminacies and ambiguities of international law to ensure dispute outcomes are certain. For example, in the settlement of the Biafran-Nigerian case, the provisions of international law should be clear on the scope of the meaning of “the people” as well as the specific conditions that must be met so that “the people” can be formed to seek their political independence and self-determination. At the same time, while accounting for contemporary social and economic demands, these organizations and entities should seek to determine the superiority of territorial integrity versus self-determination. By so doing, the paradoxes surrounding the standards under which a state might secede will be resolved considerably, thus also improving the situation in Nigeria, considering that the Biafran-Nigerian conflict is lately intensifying again, especially after the introduction of a democratic rule in the country in 1999. The next subsection will discuss these theoretical and practical implications in detail.

6.3. Implications

6.3.1. Theoretical Implication

The main theoretical implication of the findings of this study is that self-determination is slowly becoming superior to territorial integrity in recent times. This is because globalization has intensified considerably since the dawn of the new millennium in 2000. Also, since the Nigerian-Biafran Revolution ended in 1970, many countries have intensified their democratic rule. For instance, in 1999, Nigeria became a fully democratic country. In the course of these events, the Kantian perspective that cosmopolitanism is superior to a closed commercial state is being embraced more and more from time to time. In other words, international law is promoting open trade between countries. In the prediction of Immanuel Kant, this unfolding is going to demilitarise countries as their focus shifts to commercial competition. More countries are entering into mutual trade agreements. Hence, the indigenous people of Biafra are going to gain momentum in their self-determination argument as Nigeria will also loosen its end, considering that it is still going to conduct trade with Biafra mutually and beneficially. Based on this theory, the international community should seek to intervene serenely in the intensifying conflict between the indigenous people of Biafra and the Northerners, especially politicians and government officeholders.

Another theoretical implication is that besides the possibility that inter-state cooperation will diminish the significance of territorial integrity as it boosts the importance of self-determination and political independence, there is also a likelihood that as the world globalizes more and more, political power will shift towards a uniform world as headed by the United Nations and other internationally recognised peace and security organizations, and this will

consequently affluence secession efforts. For example, it is evident from the case study of this project that the fall of Biafra after secession was due to the enormous political power of the Nigerian Federal Government and its diplomatic recognition all over the world. During the Nigerian-Biafran Revolution, only a few countries diplomatically acknowledged Biafra as highlighted above. Consequently, Nigeria, which was relatively militarily equal to Biafra at the beginning of the war, ended up receiving significant aid in terms of weaponry from its international allies like Britain and the Soviet Union. In the case of a world economy, Nigerian will be relatively weak as it were the case at the beginning of the Nigerian Civil War. In other words, the self-determination of already existing national groups, for instance, Nigeria, will diminish, hence also lessening the administrative process of secession. Overall, if the indigenous people of Biafra are going to seek their self-determination through secession via peaceful means, such as engaging the United Nations in the matter, it is going to be relatively easy to succeed. The next section will discuss the practical or empirical implications of the findings of this study.

6.3.2. Empirical Implication

The empirical implication of this study relies upon the possibility of a re-emergence of another revolution in Nigeria, considering the continuing grievances of the Igbo people as they are being transmitted from one generation to another. Particularly, during the war, Biafra was very determined as evidenced by the protraction of the events. However, there are claims that humanitarian aid might have influenced the lengthiness of the duration of warfare. Though based on the evolution of the events of the war, the Igbo people were very determined in seeking political independence and self-determination because the Federal Government had consistently shown them discrimination based on their tribal affiliation. Their determination to gain the status of a fully independent and sovereign state is still palpable today as evidenced by the formation of organizations such as IPOB that aim to reclaim their inalienable rights of self-determination and political independence. Therefore, practically, it is deep that Biafra may one day become a republic, considering not only the introduction of a democratic rule in Nigeria but also the pace at which globalization is taking place. In addition to the theoretical implications highlighted above, it is also practically tangible that if the conflict reaches a climax soon, Biafra will choose the revolutionary pathway, as evidenced by the terrorist groups like Boko Haram who have originated from the Northern Region of the country. This terrorist group is used to attacking non-Muslims in the country who are mostly the Igbo people. Politically, these terrorist events are going to intensify the retaliatory efforts of the indigenous people of Biafra. Finally, considering that Britain did not secure the degree of control of the Nigerian oil

reserves as it had anticipated before deciding to aid Nigeria in the battle, the role of the international community will have a minimal impact on the outcome of the war, considering that international law principles mostly supports peaceful ways of conflict resolution. Overall, international law practitioners must put measures in place to reduce the likelihood of another revolutionary break out in the country since the primacy of peace in the social, political and economic development of the world cannot be undermined.

6.4. Recommendations

Based on the practical implication of this study, it is recommended that the international community led by the United Nations and other international peace and security organizations should come up with a diplomatic strategy that will reduce, or even eliminate the likelihood of another insurgency taking place in Nigeria. Particularly, in its agenda for Africa, especially as it is special panel to resolve the conflict peacefully. For instance, if the current legal situation dictates that self-determination is more legally powerful than territorial integrity, then the international community should seek ways to persuade Nigeria to peacefully allow the secession of the Republic of Biafra. In this way, the historical grievances of the indigenous people of Biafra shall be addressed successfully, thus preventing the possibility of another insurgency, especially in contemporariness, whereby international law advocates for peace and security in the globe.

Another recommendation is that international law practitioners across the globe should collaborate to eliminate the ambiguities and indeterminacies of international law to promote justice in the world. They caused a divided international community during the Nigerian-Biafran Revolution. Consequently, the aftermath of the war was more devastating than it could have been, considering that both the Biafran and Nigerian cases were correct within the scope of international law. Also, the findings of this study revealed that international law is being interpreted by different entities variably. A prime example is the 2010 Kosovo case, whereby the International Justice Court determined that “the people” can be shaped by many factors including but not limited to tribal and cultural affiliation, religion, language, race, and so on. Whereas, in the Nigerian-Biafran Revolution, the international community failed to determine tribal affiliation as a criterion for determining “the people”. Therefore, a collaborative effort might help in eliminating this vagueness and indeterminacy of international law, thus consequently promoting global peace and security.

6.5. Limitations

The main limitation of this study lies in its methodological approach. Particularly, this project lacked a systematic element of the reviewing process of the various scholarly documents

that were used, such as books, journal articles, seminal articles, Encyclopaedias, charters and declarations and many others. Instead, the study relied on the unsystematic way of reviewing them, such as without taking into consideration any form of empirical biases that might be contained in each of them. However, I tried to critique each of the sources in a way that will minimise both their publication and authorship biases. The critique involved a cautious scholarly deduction from the findings of each of them.

Another weakness is that the chances of this study's findings being biased are high, considering that not all the literature on this topic domain was considered. Despite that many legal documents and scholarly papers and books were reviewed, there is a possibility that many were left out. This is because there was a lack of systematic searching of the literature on various online databases. Similarly, there are chances that certain synonyms were overused while searching them online, thus increasing the chances of bias. Therefore, the findings of this study are only as good as the literature that was used in forming the central argumentation.

Finally, the combination of various types of studies, legal documents of international law, case study sources can be equated to comparing oranges and apples. Simply saying, the findings of this project are highly varied, as evidenced in the conclusion subsection of this chapter. Although the Fichtean perspectives were mainly used to consolidate the findings, the level of success in its methodological delivery can be considered empirically relatively weak.

6.6. Area for Further Study

Based on the practical implication of this study, the chances of another revolution in Nigeria due to the same Biafran-Nigerian conflict continue increasing from day to day, especially after the introduction of a pure democratic rule in the country in 1999. It is an indication that the trauma during the war has been transferred from one generation to another among the indigenous people of Biafra. They have also formed organizations, such as IPOB and launched international radio stations like VOBİ to advocate for their legal right to seeking their political independence and self-determination. Therefore, international law experts and scholars should focus on finding diplomatic ways of resolving this emerging conflict through peaceful means, hence prevent the possibility of another revolution from taking place, considering the lessons learned from the previous one. Particularly, the researchers can determine how the Fichtean perspectives can be useful in ensuring the proper interpretation of international law in the context of the Nigeria-Biafra conflict as a way to promote justice in Africa and its territories. Additionally, another area for future research should be reducing, or even eliminating the ambiguity and indeterminacy of international law. It is because of them that the indigenous people of Biafra have never been satisfied with the outcome of the

revolution, hence risking the re-emergence of another revolution in the future. Therefore, eliminating them will act as one of the prime ways of resolving tribal-political conflicts not only in Nigeria but also in other African countries like Kenya, whereby tribal politics often result in violence and chaos.

6.7 Chapter Summary

In summary, this chapter has summarised the entire findings of this project. It has offered conclusions by highlighting the main issues that were discovered in the discussion of the legality of the right of revolution from Fichtean versus international law perspectives. It was particularly concluded that people have a legal right to revolt against an unjust government that uses the rule of law to suppress their natural rights such as freedom of speech, peace, liberty, and so on. Nonetheless, various areas of concern were also encapsulated, such as the scope of the meaning of “the people” as used in various charters and declarations of international law. The chapter also provided recommendations on what can be done to prevent another revolution in Nigeria since the trauma of the 1967-1970 revolution has been transferred from generation to generation among the indigenous people of Biafra. It also offered theoretical and empirical implications of the results of this project in addition to presenting its main limitations. Finally, it also presented the main area for further study in the future – particularly, it recommended that international law experts and scholars should find means of stopping the re-emergence of another revolution in Nigeria, considering the lessons learned not only from World Wars I and II but also the 1967-1970 insurgency.